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This paper examines howfinancial market changes affect
the usefulness oftwo alternative indicators ofmonetary
policy in Japan, a monetary aggregate and an interest
rate. The paper tests whether these variables are good
predictors ofoutput, and whether responses to shocks to
these variables broadly conform to the implications ofthe
monetary transmission model, over two periods between
1960 and1992. In the earlierperiod when Japan's finan-
cial markets were less developed, a monetary aggregate
(M2+CDs) is a relatively useful indicator ofmonetary
policy whereas an interest rate variable is not. In partic-
ular, we find some evidence of a "liquidity effect" in
response to innovations in money. Neither variable is an
entirely satisfactory indicator ofmonetary policy in the
second sample. The results suggest thatfinancial market
development may have contributedto reducing the useful-
ness ofmoney as an indicator ofmonetary policy.
Are monetary. policy innovations better represented by
shocks to money or to interest rates? In order to resolve
this question, researchers have used vector autoregression
(VAR) models to attempt to ascertain whetherresponses to
innovations in either variable satisfY two criteria. First,
changes or innovations in monetary policy should be good
predictors of realeconomic activity. Second, the qualita-
tive effects ofmonetary policyinnovations shouldconform
to those predicted by the traditional monetary transmission
model; namely, in the short run, an expansionary policy
leads to an excess supply ofmoney because ofoutput and
price rigidities. In response to this excess supply, nominal
and real interest rates fall. This "liquidity effect" is a key
element in the monetary transmission mechanism which
ultimately leads to an increase in real output.
The empirical evidence is ambiguous. Research apply-
ing VAR models to U.S. data generally concludes that
interest rates are better predictors of real output than are
monetary aggregates. 1 However, responses to shocks to
either money or interest rates are not entirely consistent
with the monetary transmission model. For example, some
impulse response analyses reveal that while a positive
monetary aggregate shock is associated with increases
in the price level, it is also associated with an increase in
interestrates, orno liquidityeffect (Sims 1986, Leeperand
Gordon 1992), and a contraction in output (Sims 1986).
The last two responses do not correspond to the monetary
transmission model.2 Furthermore, while an interest rate
innovation is associated with declines in money and out-
put, as would be expected, it is also associated with an
increase in the price level, a result that contradicts the
monetary transmission model (Sims 1986).
1. See, for example, Sims (1980) and Bemanke and Blinder (1992). An
exception is Strongin (1992) which focuses on a specialrepresentation
ofa very narrow monetary aggregate.
2. However, recentresearch indicates that aliquidity effectcanbefound
in U.S. dataifanarrower monetary aggregate is used that takes some of
the subtleties of Fed operating procedure into account (Eichenbaum
1992, Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992, and Strongin 1992). While
Eichenbaum(1992) finds aliquidityeffect using anonborrowed reserves
aggregate, this measure is not entirely successful because real output
declines in response to innovations in nonborrowed reserves. Strongin
(1992) uses the ratio of nonborrowed reserves to total reserves as an
indicator ofpolicy innovations, and arecursive ordering that appears to
successfully reflect Fed operating procedure. His indicator satisfies the
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Research applying VAR models to Japanese data also
has yielded ambiguous results. For example, Suzuki, Ku-
roda, and Shirakawa (1988) find that a broad monetary
aggregate, M2+CDs, is a good predictorofJapanese real
GNP. 3 However, the dynamic responses to money shocks
presented in Sims (1992) do not conform to the transmis-
sion model. As inthe U.S., the response to amoney shock
reveals the absence of the "liquidity" effect in Japan, as
well as a contractioninoutput. Japanesedataalso yield the
"price puzzle" ofan interest rate innovation leading to a
price increase.
Two explanations may be offered for why VAR models
have failed to identify an unambiguous indicatorofmone-
tary policy in the U.S. or in Japan. FIrst, the studies cited
in this paper generally rely on a recursive identification
procedure to distinguish between innovations in money
or interest rates. Under certain conditions, innovations
identified using such a procedure will not successfully
distinguish monetary policy shocks from real shocks to
aggregate supply orshocks to money demand. Difficulties
in isolating shocks are particularly likely if monetary
authorities do notconsistently target amonetary aggregate
or an interest rate. Second, developments in financial
markets .may influence the ability to identify a policy
indicator. Forexample, even ifthe authorities consistently
target a monetary aggregate, demand shocks may still
cause short-term fluctuations in monetary aggregates if
deregulation and innovations in financial markets weaken
thecentralbank'seffectiveness incontrollingthe monetary
aggregate target. In fact, the choice of target itself may
shiftas a result ofsignificantchanges infinancial markets.
Japan provides a potentially illuminating case study to
ascertain the plausibilityofthe second explanation. Up to
the early 1980s, securities markets were undeveloped and
commercial banks were heavily dependent on the Bank of
Japan (BOJ), which used both market and nonmarket in-
struments to achieve a credit target. Subsequent deregula-
tion and innovations in financial markets have reduced the
dependence ofcommercial banks on the BOJ. As a result,
the BOJ has relied more heavily on market instruments for
monetary control, and has paid attention to both monetary
aggregates and interest rates.
The primary aim ofthis paper is to explore the implica-
tions of financial market changes for the identification 6f
monetary policy innovations in Japan. We do this by
3. The authors base this conclusion on exclusion restrictions or
"Granger causality." Ito (1982) finds that the narrower monetary
aggregate Ml is not a good predictor of Japanese output in a VAR
model, according to variance decompositions. Other studies focus on
the ability ofmoney to predict nominal GNP. See the survey by Okina
(1985).
estimating a four-variable VAR model of the Japanese
economy similar to the models estimated by Sims (1980,
1992) overtwo sampleperiods: thefirst, 1960-1980, when
securities markets were undeveloped and the BOJ wielded
much greater direct influence on commercial banks in
implementing monetary policy, and the second, 1981-
1992, when Japan's financial markets became more de-
veloped, the dependence of banks on the BOJ declined,
and the BOJ begfu~ to rely more heavily on market=based
mechanisms for monetary control.
OUf main findings may be summarized as follows. A
monetary aggregate (M2+CDs) is a relatively useful
indicator of monetary policy in the first sample period.
Money is a good predictor of output according to one
measure used, and responses to money shocks also con-
form broadly to the implications ofthe monetary transmis-
sion model. In particular, we find some evidence of a
"liquidityeffect." Inthis sample, aninterestrate indicator
has about the same predictive power as money, but re-
sponses to interest rate shocks do not entirely conform to
the monetary transmission model.
In contrast to the first sample, no entirely successful
indicator of monetary policy is identified in the second
sample. Although money continues to be a good predictor
ofoutput in this sample (much better than interest rates),
the responses to innovations in either variable cannot be
interpreted as reflecting innovations in monetary policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
I describes how financial markets and the approach to
monetary policy have changed over time in Japan. Sec-
tion II describes the macroeconomic models to be esti-
mated, discusses the approach to identification, motivates
the selection of variables included in the two alternative
models, and summarizesthe estimationprocedure. Section
III reports the results while Section IV provides some
conclusions.
I. JAPANESE MONETARY POLICY:
INSTRUMENTS AND TARGETS
The monetary transmission model implies a certain rela-
tionship among variables that can be influenced by pol-
icy-monetary aggregates and interest rates-and the
ultimate objectives of policy, such as real economic ac-
tivity. One issue confronting policymakers is whether to
targetamonetaryaggregateoraninterestrate.4 This policy
choice determines whether, in empirical analysis, a mone-
tary aggregate or an interestrate willbe a suitablemeasure
ofchanges in monetary policy. An interest rate (e.g., the
4. For a survey of this issue see Friedman (1990).14 FRBSF EcONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
interbank rate) may be considered a useful indicator of
monetary policy ifpolicymakers supply reserves perfectly
elastically to target a given interest rate. In this case,
shockstomoney demandwillnot affectthetargetedrate. A
monetary aggregate will be the appropriate indicator of
monetary policy ifmonetary authorities target the aggre-
gateand do notaccommodateshocksto demand.5 Thusthe
use ofeither an interest rate or a monetary aggregate as an
indicator of monetary policy involves fairly stringent as-
sumptions about the behavior ofmonetary authorities. In
practice, the targets and instruments used by monetary
authorities, and the commitment to any given target, vary
over time. Financial market development may also affect
the ability to control monetary aggregates with precision.
These various considerations make empirical analysis
difficult. However, such difficulties may be mitigated by
examining the institutional setting and the operating pro-
cedure employed by the BOJ, as well as the financial
market environment. Such an examination may facilitate
the choice of an indicator of monetary policy and the
interpretation ofany empirical results.6 In this section we
perform suchan institutional review, focusing on the
following questions. First, has monetary policy in Japan
primarilytargetedamonetaryaggregateorinterestrate(s)?
Second, given a choice of a particular target (or set of
targets), what operational procedure has been used to
implement it? Third, how has financial liberalization af-
fected monetary control and the choice of operational
procedure and target? To begin, we provide some back-
ground on the postwar Japanese financial system.
Japan's Financial System
Throughout most ofthe postwar period, the task ofmobi-
lizing funds from net savers to investors in Japan has fallen
primarily on the banking sector. Up to the 1980s, the
government intervened actively in this process of inter-
mediation, initially in an effortto promote investment and
growth, and later to meet the financing needs of the
government. Deposit rates were strictly controlled, while
the bank lendingrate was anchored to the official discount
5. There may be ambiguities in interpreting the stance of monetary
policy when using an interest rate target. Since shocks to demand are
fully accommodated, an unchanged interestrate may beconsistentwith
stimulus or contraction in output.·Similar difficulties in interpretation
may arise when focusing on a money aggregate if money demand is
unstable. Such instability became a concern in Japan in the second
half of the 1980s, when money growth accelerated with less-than-
proportionate increases in nominal income.
6. For example, Strongin (1992) motivates a recursive identification
procedure from knowledge of the Federal Reserve's operational pro-
cedures. However, his reasoning is not applicable to Japan.
rate,ensuring a relatively tight link between government
interest rate policy and the costoffunds faced by nonbank
borrowers, Selective and aggregate credit targeting en-
sureddirect government inputin the allocation and growth
in credit, as did the heavy reliance ofbanks on borrowing
from the BOJ's discount window. Controls over the non-
bank financial sector ensured that marketforces would not
erode the effectiveness of banking sector controls. For
example, the government controlled which firms could
issue bonds as well as the corporate bond rate. Finally,
exchange and capital controls prevented financial market
participants from circumventing regulation via overseas
transactions.
Japan'sregulatedfinancial systemgraduallygave way to
marketforces beginning in the mid-1970s. Themainfactor
appears to have been the slowdown in economic growth in
the early 1970s, which sharply reduced government reve-
nues and prompted large increases in government borrow-
ing. Initially, government bonds were allocated to banks at
below-market interest rates, but as the volume ofborrow-
ing increased, there was strong pressure for the develop-
mentofan active seconda.ry marketingovernmentbonds at
a market-determined rate. By arbitrage, this stimulated
the development ofshort-term money markets such as the
gensaki (repurchase) and CD markets. However, a short-
term government debt market did not develop until very
recently. The liberalization offinancial markets extended
to international capital transactions, restrictions on which
were progressively dismantled in the course ofthe 1980s.7
Monetary Control Prior to Deregulation
In an environment in which banks dominated as financial
intermediaries and the heavily indebted private business
sector had virtually no alternative to bank loans for exter-
nal financing, the BOJ's traditional approach to monetary
controlconsistedofcontrollingthe amountofbanklending
to the nonfinancial corporate sector. We can thinkofthis as
similar to monetary targeting because, with corporate
loans dominating the asset side of banks' balance sheets,
bankcreditandbroad monetary aggregates tendedto move
very closely for much of the postwar period. While it is
clearfrom accounts ofBOJpractices thatthe BOJattached
a great deal of importance to achieving its credit targets,
these credittargets have not been disclosed, so itis unclear
whether they were truly exogenous, or whether the BOJ
from time to time accommodated shocks to creditdemand.
Also,. the weight the BOJ attached to curbing inflation
7. For overviews of the postwar Japanese financial system and the
process ofderegulation, see Feldman (1986) and HamadaandHoriuchi
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prior to the mid-1970s is uncertain, whereas it is appar-
ent that a high weight was attached to curbing inflation
since then.
To achieve its creditobjectives, the BOJreliedlargelyon
two instruments. First, it sought to influence interest rates
in the interbank market. Second, it provided direct guide-
lines for commercial bank lending.8
InterbankInterestRates. Onaday-to-day basis, the BOJ
sought to influence the supply of credit and money by
targetingthe callmoney rate in theinterbankmarket.9 To a
large extent, the transmission mechanism relied upon
interestrate rigidities in the system and the heavy depend-
ence ofthe corporate sectoronbanklending. Loan as well
as deposit rates were subject to administrative controls, so
banks could not easily pass on to corporate borrowers
changes in the interbank rates. In this setting, changes in
the call money rate had a direct and immediate impact on
bank profitability, and consequently on the growth of
money and credit. For example, a rise in the call rate
resulting from BOJ tightening would reduce the marginal
profitability of lending. In response, banks would ration
credit, forcing corporations to curtail investment, and the
process·would.ultimately result ina reduction in the broad
money supply. 10
Accounts ofBOJ's operating procedures suggest that
reserves were supplied elastically at the call market rate
consistent with the targeted level of credit. Monetary
authorities paid particular attention to the "reserve pro-
gress ratio," which measures reserves accumulated by
banks relative to those required within a maintenance pe-
riod.II Notably, call transactions in Japan involved money
market brokers (Tanshi kaisha). These brokers maintain
close informational contact with the BOJ and, in close
consultation with the BOJ, setthe rate atthe openingofthe
marketseachday. Iftheinitiallyquotedratefailed toequate
demand and supply, the BOJ typically would adjust the
supply of reserves to achieve. equilibrium at its target
interest rate. 12
8. The BOJ occasionally alsoresorted to changes in required reserves.
These changes were relatively infrequent, and the useofthis instrument
was discontinued in 1982.
9. The call marketrateis a short-termmarketcomparabletothe Federal
funds market in the U.S. It is still the BOJ's primary operating target.
There is also a bill discount market where commercial bills are
discounted.
10. For an authoritative discussion of the transmission channels of
monetary policy in Japan, see Suzuki (1980), parts II, ill, and IV.
11. The reserve maintenanceperiodinJapanis one month that straddles
two calendar months. It runs from the 16th day ofa month through the
15th day ofthe following month.
12. Under such a system, interbankrates could notfluctuate on adaily
basis. SeeDotsey (1986) andFukui (1986) for details. Similaroperating
In the absence of a short-term market for government
debt, discount window lending by the BOJ was the main
instrument for short-run adjustments ofbank reserves. A
rationing scheme governed this method of monetary con-
trol. The BOJ provided loans to financial institutions
(mainly city banks) at the official discount rate (ODR),
typically at a rate below the interest rates in the interbank
market. BOJ lending thus amounted to a subsidy and
Japanese banks naturaHy preferred to rely on the central
bankfor liquidity. 13 Consequently, in contrast to the U.S.,
where the ratio ofborrowed reserves to required reserves
seldom exceedS 5 percent, the level of discount window
borrowing by Japanese banks often has exceeded the level
ofrequired reserves.
Direct Control ofBank Credit. Another instrument of
monetary control by the BOJ was the direct quantitative
control of·commercial bank lending through so-called
"window guidance." To tighten the supply ofmoney and
credit, the BOJ would impose individual ceilings on new
lendingby commercialbanks, inparticular, thecitybanks.
Informulating these ceilings, the authorities usedinforma-
tion garnered during day-to-day contacts through deposit
and lending transactions withindividual financial institu-
tions, such as their future loan plans and prospective fund
positions. In addition, the BOJ received from city banks
reports on a longer-term basis (monthly until 1963 and
quarterly thereafter) which included forecasts of future
fund-raising activity and the outlook for deposits and
loans.
The BOJ had a number ofways to dissuade banks from
lending in excess of their prescribed ceiling, such as
curbing its discount window lending, thus compelling a
bankto borrowinthe more expensive callmoney marketor
to sell commercial bills. In practice, banks compliedwith
BOJ guidelines with little need ofpersuasion because of
their heavy reliance on BOJ discount window loans for
their funds. Thus, according to Suzuki (1980), in no case
did a bank exceed the limits imposed up to the late 1970s.
Monetary Control under Financial Liberalization
Themid-1970s initiateda processoffinancial deregulation
and innovation that continues to date. From the vantage
point of conducting monetary policy, three changes have
beenparticularly significant. First, the importanceofbank
arrangements are in place today except that interbank rates fluctuate
more freeiythan in the past. See footnote 18.
13. The BOJ decided on the level ofbank borrowing (up to a predeter-
mined quarterly ceiling), the term of borrowing, and the interest rate
associated with borrowing. Officials at the BOJ could call up each city
bank as frequently as daily to indicate how much they could borrow.16 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
loans has sharply declined as a result ofthe slowdown in
corporate investment and the move toward securitization.
This, coupledwiththelargeflotationofgovernmentbonds,
has weakened the link between corporate lending and the
monetary aggregate. Second, banks have beenable toraise
funds from a wider array offinancial instruments and mar-
kets, such as the CD and euroyen markets, thus reducing
their reliance on BOJ credit and eroding BOJ lever-
age in using credit rationing under window guidance.
Third, assets with market-determined prices have come to
predominate the portfolios of all sectors of the econ-
omy. The disintermediation between administered and
market-pricedassetshasweakenedBOl'straditional trans-
mission channel ofaltering the spread between interbank
rates, on the one hand, and the administered loan and
deposit rates, on the other.
These developments have led to a gradual shift from the
late 1970s through the 1980s in the objectives ofmonetary
policy. The BOJ began to pay more direct attention to the
behaviorofmonetary'-asopposedto credit-aggregates,
andin1978 beganannouncing "forecasts" ofthe growthin
M2+CDs. However, it is not clear that the BOJ has fully
embraced monetary targeting, as might be inferred from
the writings of some influential observers. (Friedman
1985, Meltzer 1986.) First, as BOJ officials emphasize
repeatedly,these announced figures are projections rather
than targets.14 There is evidence suggesting that the BOJ
has not tried systematically to offset differences between
actual and targeted money (Ito 1989, Judd and Hutchison
1992). Second, broad money has not been the sole target,
but has served as one of the primary indicators among a
group of financial variables (Hamada and Hayashi 1985,
Hutchison1986, and Kasman andRodrigues 1991). Infact,
theBOJappears to have gradually reducedits emphasis on
broad money in recent years while focusing a greatdeal of
attention on market interest rates (e.g. the call rate, the
gensaki or repurchase rate, and the CD rate). 15
Concomitant with these changes in the policy targets or
indicators, the BOl's operational procedures have evolved
14. Forexample, Suzuki states (1986, pp.192-193) that the BOJ focuses
on control of the broad money supply but does not set a target. He
indicates further that the BOJ "does not follow an operating procedure
rule of constant money supply growth." Also, as noted by Judd and
Hutchison (1992), these "annual" forecasts which were announced on a
quarterly basis actually extended only one quarter ahead; that is, the
forecasted annual growthrates are averagesofthreequarters ofrealized,
and one quarterofprojected, money growth. As such, these projections
containedrelatively little new information on monetary policy stance as
compared to, say, the Federal Reserve's targets.
15. The increased attention paid to market interest rates is officially
acknowledged by the BOJ staff itself. Nakao and Horii (1991) note, for
instance, that the BOJ "has increased the number of reservations it
as well. The use ofdiscount window guidance, in theform
ofthe central bank instructing individual banks in their
lendingplans, was curtailed, although amore limitedform
of window guidance, through which the BOJ communi-
catedits aggregate lending plans and.overall policy stance
to individual banks, continued into 1991.
In the wake of financial liberalization, the BOJ also
extendeditsinterventionoutsidetheinterbankmarket. The
BOJ began open market operations in CDs in 1986,
gensaki in 1987, and commercial paper in 1989, when
active operations in short-termgovernment securities were
also initiated.16 Nevertheless, the call money rate (along
with the interbank commercial bill rate) is still the most
importantinterestratetargetoftheBOJ, and BOJ discount
window lending is still the primary mechanism for regulat-
ing the quantity ofbank reserves.I? Indeed, the effective-
ness ofthe call market appears to have been enhanced by
the greater flexibility in interbank·interest rates resulting
from deregulation in the late 1970s.18
Monetary Control: Summary and Implications
Our discussion sheds light on two important elements of
the BOl's approach to monetary policy in the postwar
period. First, with respect to targeting, there is some
uncertainty about the precise features of BOJ credit or
money targeting. During the earlierperiods, credit targets
were reportedly consistently met. However, these tar-
gets were not announced, so itis unclearwhetherthey were
exogenous or adjusted to accommodate shocks to money
demand. There also has been disagreement on whetherthe
Bank of Japan actually adopted monetary targeting after
1978. However, BOJ statements suggest that there was no
strict targeting as such, and that the behavior ofmonetary
applies to its interpretation of money supply, bank credit and other
volume indicators offinance. . . [whilelithas enhancedattentiongiven
to market interest rate developments."
16. Because of the relatively underdeveloped market for short-term
government securities, open marketoperations inJapan necessarily have
relied upon private short-term instruments.
17. See for example, Ohkubo (1983), Suzuki (1986), and Suzuki, etal.
(1988).
18. Notable changes in the interbank market include: allowance for
more frequent quotations on the call rate and the resale ofbills allowed
after one month from purchase (June 1978); the introduction of seven-
day call money with a freely determined interest rate (October 1978);
and the introduction ofone-monthbills atunregulated rates (November
1978). The process of liberalizing the interbank market was largely
concluded in 1979 with the abolition of quotation systems in the call
market and the introduction of shorter-term (2-6 days) call money
(April) and the liberalization ofrates on 2-month bills (October). From
late 1979, therefore, rates in both the call andbillmarkethave fluctuated
daily (Dotsey 1986).MORENO AND KIMI MONEY, INTEREST RATES AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: JAPAN 17
aggregates was monitored along with ot~er. indicator~,
such as interestrates. BOJ statements also mdlcate that m
recent years the weight assigned to interest rates has
increased.
Second, in the credit-dominated regime prior to the
onset of financial deregulation and innovation, the BOJ
depended more heavily on nonmarket mechanisms for
monetary control, such as window guidance, to control
money andcredit. Tnere were also few substitutesfor bank
deposits, so portfolio shifts were less likely to aff~t the
behavior of monetary aggregates. It seems plaUSIble to
arguethatthe BOJ'sability to controlmonetary aggregates
precisely was greater during this earlier period than it.was
later whentheBOJdeemphasizednonmarketmechamsms
for c~ntrol and when the development offinancial markets
broadened the spectrum of assets available to savers.
Given these characteristics, it seems reasonable to ex-
pect that monetary aggregates are unlikely to serve as a
good indicator of monetary policy since the late 1970s or
early 1980s, when financial innovation b~g~ in J~pan.
Monetary aggregates.will serve as a good mdlcator m the
earlier period if credit targets did not accommodate de-
mand shocks which, as stated previously, is not entirely
clear. The reason is that during this earlierperiodfinancial
markets wererelatively less developed and the BOJ relied
more heavily on direct, nonmarket·instruments that are
likely to have significantly enhanced.the. pr~cision of. its
control. As for interest rates,our mstItutIOnal reVIew
provides no clearcutbasisfordeciding whetherthey might
serve as useful policy indicators. However, the reader may
note that the BOJ appears to have consistently used an
interest rate as an operating target, and appears to have
paidcloserattentionto the implications ofinterestrates for
aggregate economic activity as the 1980s progresse~. !he
empirical analysis may clarify someofthese uncertamtIes.
II. THE MODEL
Structural Model andIdentification
To motivate the approach followed in this paper, consider
an economy described by a vector ofnonpolicy variable~,
Zt' that may be represented by indicators of econOI~llc
activity like output and inflation, and a vector of pohcy
variables, It, that can be influenced by monetary au-
thorities, suchas amonetary aggregateandaninterestrate.
The interaction by the variables is summarized by the
following two.equations19
(1) Zt = BOZt + B1Zt- 1+ COlt + Clt- I + ut
19. See Bemanke and Blinder (1992) for a similar discussion.
(2) It = DoZt + D1Zt - l + Glt- l + vt
where u, v are orthogonal disturbances.
One way of identifying this model is to assume that
contemporaneousI does not enter equation (1) (Co = 0), so
policy actions affect real variables only with a lag: How-
ever, policymakers respond to contemporaneous mnova-
tions in macroeconomic activity.
(4) It = (Dl + DoCI - BO)-IBl)Zt_l
+ (G + DoCI - BO)-lC1)It_1+ vt
+ Do(I - BO)-IUt
In equation (4) It is contemporaneously affected by the
policy innovation vt and also by contemporaneous macro-
economic shocks ut• Identification as proposed above can
be obtained by estimating a VAR comprising Z, I. The
orthogonalized innovations that satisfy the recurs~ve s~c­
tureassumedinequations (3) and(4) canthenbeIdentIfied
by applying the Choleski decomposition.to the v~an~:­
covariance matrix of the residuals, puttmg I last m me
ordering.
The model described above can be used to assess the
predictive ability ofalternative possible measures ofmon-
etary policy by: (i) testing for the significance ofexclusion
restrictions on monetary policy variables in the industrial
production equation, (ii) estimati~g t~e respective.contri-
butions oforthogonalized innovatIons m money ormterest
rates to the variance of the forecast error of output at
various horizons. Similarprocedures for assessing predic-
tive ability are usedby Sims (1980,1992) andby Bernanke
and Blinder (1992).
To ascertain whether responses to monetary variables
conformtotheoretical expectations, theVAR modelcanbe
inverted to obtain the impulse responses (the coefficients
of the moving average representation of the model) to
orthogonalized innovations in money and interest rates. A
comparison ofthese responses can then be used to assess
the extent to which the responses to innovations in these
variables conform to the monetary transmission model
described earlier.
As is well known, the Choleski identification procedure
proposed here has beencriticizedon a numberof grou~~.
One potential difficulty is that the results can be senSItIve
to the ordering of the variables.20 Another difficulty, re-
flected in the sometimes counterintuitive responses to
20. This criticismdoes not apply tothe model used in thispaperbecause
the contemporaneous correlations ofthe residuals ofthe estimated VAR
model are low.18 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
shocks cited earlier in the introduction, is that it is not
entirely clear how innovations identified using this pro-
cedure are to be interpreted. For example, orthogonalized
innovations in money may reflect shocks to money supply
or money demand.
At least two responses may be offered to these criti-
cisms. First, the application of these identification meth-
ods to Japanese data can actually shed further light on the
plausibilityofthe Choleski identificationprocedure, which
is still widely used in empirical VAR models of the U.S.
(The users include authors who have also lised alternative
identification procedures explicitly based on economic
theory, such as Bernanke and Sims). If the responses to
shocks broadly conform to theoretical expectations, it can
be argued that the Choleski procedure is a reasonable
approximation to a model that is identified on the basis of
economic theory.
Second, efforts to identify VAR models using economic
theory have also been criticized on various grounds. As
pointed out by Sims (1986), any empirical study raises
debatable questions about identification that will leave
readers more or less uncomfortable about applying the
conclusions. Under these circumstances, researchers may
bewell advised toexperimentwith different approaches to
identification. The present paper can then be seen as one
step in allowing the data "to speak" about Japanese mac-
roeconomic behavior. 21 Future studies that attempt to uti-
lize alternative identification procedures are not ruled out.
The Model
A four-variable monthly VAR model for Japan was esti-
mated, comprising industrial production(IP) to represent
output, the consumer price index (CPI) to represent price,
a broad monetary aggregate (M2+CDs) to represent
money, and the interbank call money rate (CMR) to
represent interest rates. The variables were entered in this
orderinidentifying the orthogonalized innovations.22The
dataspan the period 1961.1-1992.8. Data and sources are
described in the Appendix.
21. Structural VAR models of the Japanese economy have been esti-
mated by Hutchison and Walsh (1992), Hutchison (forthcoming), and
Moreno (1992). However, none ofthese models are explicitly designed
to analyze monetary policy.
22. The ordering places M2+CDs prior to CMR, which assumes that
the former is contemporaneously unaffectedby innovations to the latter.
However, thecorrelationbetweenresidualsinthe M2+CDs andthe call
moneyrateequations is small, about8percentinthe first subsampleand
18 percent in the second. Thus, the results are not likely to be very
sensitive to the ordering assumed.
As discussedearlier, financial liberalizationandchanges
in the Bank of Japan's approach to monetary policy are
likely to have affected the relationship between money and
interest rates and economic activity. This suggests that it
wouldbedesirabletoestimatethe model overtwo subsam-
pIes. The first subsample would correspond to the period
when financial markets were undeveloped, commercial
banks were heavilydependentonthe BOJfor funding, and
the BOJ emphasized credit targets and sought to influence
bank behavior directly through window guidance. The
second would correspond to the period when financial
markets were more developed, commercial banks had
more access to sources of financing outside the BOJ
(including external financing), and the BOJ paid more
attention to money and interest rates (rather than credit)
and began to rely more heavily on market-based mecha-
nisms for monetary control.
Given the gradual pace offinancial innovation in Japan,
thereis no obvioussinglecandidatefor abreakdate. Likely
candidates for a break date are somewhere between 1975,
when large quantities of government bonds were first
issued, and 1981, when Japan's foreign exchange controls
were first liberalized. The date 1981.1, which is the first
month after foreign exchange controls were liberalized in
Japan, is selected as a reasonable candidate. At that time,
the liberalization of controls loosened the dependence of
Japanese commercial banks on the BankofJapan by allow-
ing them to draw on foreign sources offunding. Also, the
impact of gradual financial liberalization on macroeco-
nomic relationships is more likely to have beenmanifest by
then. Thus, the first sample period spans 1961.1~1980.12,
and the second, 1981.1-1992.8.
To account for non-stationarity in the data, the model
was estimated in first differences of the logs of the vari-
ables, withtheexceptionofthe interestrate, wherethe first
difference ofthe series was used.23 As the frequency ofthe
data was monthly, lag lengths were set at 12 for both sub-




To assess the predictive ability of alternative monetary
indicators, Table 1reports the results oftests for exclusion
restrictions on the right-hand-side variables of the output
23. As is by now well-known, however, there is a great deal of
uncertainty. surrounding the stochastic properties of macroeconomic
data (Cochrane 1991, Rudebusch 1992).MORENO AND KIM/MONEY, INTEREST RATES AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: JAPAN 19
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
TABLE 1
Do Responses Conform to the Monetary Model?
To assess whether innovations to money or interest rates
conform to the predictions of the monetary transmission
model, Figure 1reports thepointestimatesoftheresponses
of the variables to innovations in monetary aggregates in
the first and second samples, while Figure 2.illustrates the
corresponding responses to interest rate innovations.











8.7 X 10-6 .04 8.4x 10-4 2.7 X 10-3
TESTS OF EXCLUSION RESTRICTIONS
IP CPI M2 + CDs CMR
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION (PERCENT)
Months IP CPI M2+CDs CMR
12 79 8 11 1
1960.1-1980.12 24 27 44 13 15
36 16 60 8 16
12 54 7 39 1
1981.1-1992.8 24 26 15 58 1
36 15 21 64 0
NOTES:
** Significant at 1%
* Significant at 5%
1981.1-1992.8
1960.1-1980.12
also interesting that our finding that money is not a good
predictor of output according to variance decompositions
for the first subsample is similar to Ito's (1982) findings
using M1 over a similar period.
To sum up, the preceding findings provide mixed evi-
dence that both moneyand interest rates are good predic-
tors ofoutput in the first sample. Money is a much better
predictor of output in the second sample. These findings
support the view that money may be a useful indicator of
monetary policy, perhaps better than the interest rate.
However, such a conclusion is valid only ifinnovations to
money satisfy the predictions ofthe monetary transmission
model, while innovations in interest rates do not. We tum
to this question now.
24. TheSuzuki, etal. (1988) modelcomprises basemoney, theweighted
average ofthe call money rate and the bill rate, M2 + CDs, real output,
and the GNPdeflator. Otherstudies havefocused largely on the abilityof
money to predict nominal output. See also the survey by Okina (1985).
(industrialproduction) equation and the results ofvariance
decompositions of the forecast error ofoutput.
In· the first subsample, tests of exclusion restrictions
indicate that money is agood predictorofoutput; in fact, it
is better than the interest rate. The evidence offered by
variance decompositions is mixed. Money and the interest
rate make similar(and relatively small) contributionsto the
variance of the forecast error after two years, after which
the contribution of money falls off, while the contribution
ofthe call money rate remains.about the same. Itis worth
noting the Japanese economy experienced relatively large
supply shocks during this period (notably, large declines in
productivity and growth), and also fiscal policy shocks,
andthese may have tendedto reduce the observedcontribu-
tion ofthe monetary indicators (money or interest rates) to
the variance ofthe forecast error of output.
For this sample, money and the interest rate are both
generally good predictors of output, so the criterion of
predictive ability does not allow us to choose unam-
biguously between the two. An analysis of responses to
innovations in .each of these variables is needed to shed
further light on which variable may be abetterindicator of
monetary policy in Japan in this sample period. This is in
contrast to Sims's (1980) well-known result for the U.S.
case, which found that interest rates rob the monetary
aggregate of predictive power. According to the criterion
ofpredictive ability, in the U.S. the interest rate is favored
overmoney as anindicatorofmonetary policyinnovations.
In the second subsample, tests ofexclusion restrictions
as well as the variance decomposition results indicate that
themonetary aggregateis amuch betterpredictorofoutput
than is the call money rate. At a two-year horizon, money
accounts for 58 percent ofthe variance ofthe forecast error
ofoutput in the second sub-sample, compared to 1percent
for the. call money rate. In fact, the predictive power of
moneyis much largerinthe second subsample (58 percent)
than in the first subsample (13 percent).
Our findings on predictive ability are consistent with
some previous studies of the Japanese economy that use
similar techniques and also replicate some ambiguities
observed in this literature. In particular, the finding that
money is a good predictor of real GNP according to
exclusionrestrictions inboth subsamples is consistentwith
Suzuki, et al. (1988) which findings are based on a five-
variable VAR over the period 1968.Q1':"'1987.Q4.24 It is20 FRBSFEcoNOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
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the pointestimate. The standarderrors are obtainedusing a
bootstrapping procedure.25
Focusing on the point estimates, in the first subsample
an innovation to money is associated with a fall in the in-
terestrate below its initial level thatpersists for about ayear
and ahalf, followed by apersistentrise that is subsequently
reversed.·Thus, there appears to be a "liquidity effect" in
this model. Other responses to innovations in money are
broadly consistent withthe monetary transmission model.
In response to a monetary aggregate shock, output rises
temporarily, while prices rise after about one year.
In response to apositive interestrate innovation, money
falls, and output falls. However, there is an extended
increase in the price level that is difficult to interpret. A
similar "pricepuzzle"was found by Sims (1992, 1986) for
Japan and the U.S. While the responses to innovations in
interestrates are difficultto interpret, onepossibility is that
they reflect aggregate supply shocks. This would account
for asetofevents where interestrates rise, outputfalls, and
the price level rises. An alternative explanation, offered by
Sims, is that interest rate innovations reflect an effort
by monetary authorities to offset anticipate'A increases in
prices. However, the inflationary pressure is not entirely
offset so an increase in price is observed following the
increase in the.interest rate.
Figure 1indicates that in contrast to the first subsample,
inthe second sub-sample an innovation in money is associ-
ated with an increase in the interest rate. Thus, there
appears to be no liquidity effect. As in the first subsample,
output, prices and money increase; however, the responses
ofoutput and money are much larger and more persistent
than in the first subsample. The direction ofthe responses
suggests that money innovations are demand shocks. How-
ever, the persistence ofthe responses suggests the presence
ofpermanent supply shocks. Thus, innovations to money
are not easily interpreted in this sample. Figure 2 reveals
thatall the variables in the model now rise in response to an
innovation in interest rates (in the case of output, after
25. To construct the standard errorband, we bootstrapped the residuals
ofthe VAR. The residuals were used to constructartificial series for the
variables in the models. The VARs were then rerun using the artificial
series and the impulse responses were recomputed. The simulations
were repeated 1200 times. The one standard error band was computed
by taking the square root ofthe mean squared deviation ofthe artificial
impulse responses (above and below) from the point estimate ateach
step. By construction, the impulseresponses obtainedusing theoriginal
data are inside the band. They are also asymmetric. This resembles the
procedureused by Blanchardand Quah (1989). Itmay be noted that ina
few cases, the actual responses to shocks fell partly outside the space
spannedby the artificial impulse responses. Inthese cases, the standard
errorbands are not shaded over the applicable horizons. This difficulty
should be borne in mind in interpreting the results.
an initial decline). These results suggest that an increase in
interest rates reflects increases in the demand for money
rather than a tightening in policy.
To sum up, the responses to innovations in money in the
first sample fit the predictions of the monetary transmis-
sion model, but do not do so in the second sample. Re-
sponses to innovations in interest rates do not consistently
fit the predictions of the monetary transmission model in
eitherperiod. Taken together with the results on predictive
ability citedearlier, money appears to be arelatively useful
indicator ofmonetary policy shocks in the first sample. In
contrast, the methods used in this paperdo not successfully
identify a monetary policy indicator in the second sample.
The results for the first sample should be interpreted with
caution, because estimates are in some cases imprecise.
Nevertheless, they are quite interesting, as they suggest
that financial market development may have contributed to
reducing the usefulness ofmoney as an indicatorofmone-
tary policy in Japan.
The preceding results may also be compared to those
reported in Sims (1992)which studied several industrial
economies, including Japan. SirIls finds that the response
ofoutput to a monetary innovation is negative and is not
associated with aliquidity effect. To isolate the reasons for
the differences, we reestimated the model using Ml over
two subsamples, and found that Sims's results differ from
ours largely because he uses Ml rather than M2+CDs as a
monetary aggregate.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides suggestive evidence that a broad
monetary aggregate is a better indicator of monetary
policy than an interestrate during the period when Japan's
financial markets were less developed, the BOJ focused on
a credit target and relied more heavily on nonmarket
instruments for monetary control to achieve its policy
target. During this period, there is mixed evidence that
both a monetary aggregate and an interest rate are good
predictors ofoutput. However, analysis ofthe responses to
shocks suggests that the monetary aggregate is the better
indicator of monetary policy; Responses to money shocks
broadly conform to the implications ofthe monetary trans-
mission model, whereas the responses to interest rates do
not. In particular, point estimates indicate the existence of
a liquidity effect in response to innovations in a monetary
aggregate. Responses to interest rate innovations suggest
that such innovations may reflect aggregate supply shocks
or policy responses to anticipated inflation.
In the second period, when Japan's financial markets
became more developed, and the BOJ appeared to adopt a
more eclectic approach to monetary policy, money isMORENO AND KIM/ MONEY, INTEREST RATES AND EcONOMIC ACTIVITY: JAPAN 23
unambiguously a good predictor of output, whereas the
interestrate is not. Howeverthis does not imply that money
is a good indicator of policy, as the responses to innova-
tions do not conform to the monetary transmission model.
In particular, there is no evidence of a liquidity effect,
suggesting that money innovations are betterinterpreted as
reflecting shocks to demand rather than policy changes.
Interest rate innovations also appear to reflect shocks to
demand.
As is often the case in this type ofanalysis, the estimates
are in some cases imprecise and shouldbe interpretedwith
caution. Nevertheless, they are quite interesting, as they
suggest that financial market development may have con-
tributed to reducing the usefulness ofmoney as an indica-
tor of monetary policy. As discussed in our institutional
review, this may have occurred because financial market
development encouraged the Bank ofJapan to pay greater
attention to interest rates and.also loosened the control of
monetary authorities over the monetary aggregate. Similar
forces may explain why researchers have had difficulty in
identifying an indicator ofmonetary policy in the U.S.,
where financial markets have been much more developed
than Japanese financial markets in the postwar period.
ApPENDIX
Data Description andSources
Consumer Price Index, Seasonally Adjusted(CPI): Index
ofconsumer prices covering the whole country exclud-
ing single-person households and those engaged mainly
in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Base year is1985.
Seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve BilI-ue of San
Francisco staff using X-ll filter. Source: International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics
(IFS).
Industrial Production, Seasonally Adjusted(IP): Index of
monthly production by 9mining and 523 manufacturing
industries, weighted by 1985 value-added data. Base
year is 1985. Seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco staff using X-ll filter. Source:
IFS.
Call Money Rate (CMR). Rate in interbank call money
market. Source: Bank ofJapan.
M2 +CDs, Seasonally Adjusted: Ml plus quasi-money
(time, savings,·and foreign currency deposits ofresident
sectors other than central government) plus certificates
ofdeposit in trillions of yen. End ofmonth. Seasonally
adjustedby FederalReserve BankofSanFrancisco Staff
by applying X-II filter. Source: IPS.24 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
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